State v. Sepulveda Supplemental Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42758 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-13-2016
State v. Sepulveda Supplemental Respondent's Brief
Dckt. 42758
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Sepulveda Supplemental Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42758" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5947.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5947
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Nos. 42758 & 42759 
 
Ada Co. Case Nos.  
CR-2013-18132 & CR-2014-1189 
 
________________________ 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE JASON D. SCOTT 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
TED S. TOLLEFSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
P. O. Box 2816 
Boise, Idaho  83701 
(208) 334-2712 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
 
 Nature of the Case..................................................................................... 1 
 
 Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ........................................ 1 
 
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 5 
 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 6 
 
The “Pleading Theory” Was Based On Statutory 
Interpretation And Did Not Create A Separate 
Double Jeopardy Right Under The Idaho Constitution .............................. 6 
 
 A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 6 
 
 B. Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 6 
 
 C. The Blockburger Test Is The Only Test  
  Applicable To The Double Jeopardy Provision 
  Of The United States Constitution .................................................. 7 
 
 D. The Idaho Supreme Court Has Not Adopted 
  A Double Jeopardy Standard In Direct Conflict 
  With The Double Jeopardy Analysis Of The 
  United States Supreme Court ......................................................... 9 
 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 19 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 19 
 
 
  ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1985) ........................................................ 8 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) ..................................... passim 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) ................................................................... 11 
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985) .................................................. 7, 8 
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) .............................................................. 8 
Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986) .................................... 13, 17 
State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352 P.2d 972 (1960) ......................... 12, 13, 14 
State v. Blacksten, 86 Idaho 401, 387 P.2d 467 (1963) ......................... 12, 13, 14 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................ 7 
State v. Cochran, 149 Idaho 688, 239 P.3d 793 (Ct. App. 2010) ....................... 16 
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 256 P.3d 776 (2011) ......................... 7, 8, 10, 16 
State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 944 P.2d 119 (1997) ................................... 16, 17 
State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 90 P.3d 306 (2004)................................................. 9 
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 261 P.3d 519 (2011) ......................................... 17 
State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 354 P.3d 446 (2015)..................................... 9, 15 
State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992) ....................................... 9 
State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 383 P.2d 602 (1963) .......................................... 12, 13 
State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 265 P.3d 1155 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................... 7 
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 P.3d 276 (2013) ................................................. 17 
State v. Matalamaki, 139 Idaho 341, 79 P.3d 162 (Ct. App. 2003) .................... 16 
State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621 (2016) ........................................ 17 
  iii 
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 291 P.3d 1036 (2013) ................................. 17 
State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 138 P.3d 308 (2006) ....................................... 16 
State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 123, 138 P.3d 323 (Ct. App. 2005) ......................... 16 
State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 330 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2014) ............................ 17 
State v. Payne, 134 Idaho 423, 3 P.3d 1251 (2000) .......................................... 16 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) .................................. 6, 7, 18 
State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, 84 P.3d 586 (Ct. App. 2004) ................................ 16 
State v. Rosencrantz, 130 Idaho 666, 946 P.2d 628 (1997) .............................. 16 
State v. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 339 P.3d 372 (2014) ......................... 17 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 14 P.3d 378 (Ct. App. 2000) ............................. 7 
State v. Seamons, 126 Idaho 809, 892 P.2d 484 (1995) ................................... 15 
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980) .......................... passim 
State v. Weatherly, 160 Idaho 302, __ P.3d __ (Ct. App. 2016) ........................ 17 
State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 825 P.2d 501 (1992) ...................................... 9 
United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985)................................................ 9 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-301 ................................................................................................. 13, 15 
I.C. § 19-2312 .............................................................................................. passim 
 
  1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Cesar Antonio Sepulveda appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
jury verdict finding him guilty of felony intimidating a witness and misdemeanor 
domestic battery, injury to child and two counts of attempted violation of a no 
contact order. 
After oral argument, Sepulveda requested supplemental briefing.  (See 
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Briefing, filed June 15, 2016.)  This Court 
ordered supplemental briefing “regarding the continuing validity of Idaho’s 
‘pleading theory’ for determining whether an offense is an included offense of 
another for double jeopardy in light of the repeal of I.C. section 18-301.”  (See 
June 29, 2016 Order Granting Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Briefing.)   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously laid out 
in the State’s Respondent’s brief.  (See Resp. Br., pp. 1-8.)  The facts and 
course of proceedings related to the issues not subject to the supplemental 
briefing will not be repeated, but are incorporated herein to the extent necessary.  
The facts and course of proceedings relevant to the supplemental briefing are 
summarized below.   
The state charged Sepulveda in Case No. CR-FE-2013-008132 with 
attempted strangulation and misdemeanor injury to child.  (R., pp. 8-9, 49-51, 56-
58, 166-167.)  The magistrate issued a no contact order preventing Sepulveda 
from having any contact with L.M.  (R., p. 14.)  The no contact order was later 
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amended to prevent Sepulveda from having contact with child victims as well.  
(R., p. 48.) 
While Sepulveda was in custody he attempted to contact L.M. several 
times through different third parties and repeatedly tried to get L.M. to say the 
allegations against him were false or else not to show up for court.  (R., pp. 246-
247.)  These multiple calls were recorded.  (See id.)  The state charged 
Sepulveda in Case No. CR-FE-2014-00011891 with felony intimidating, 
impeding, influencing or preventing attendance of a witness and with two counts 
of attempted violation of a no contact order.  (Id.)  
The Information, as amended, states:  
COUNT I 
 
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or 
between the 29th day of December, 2013 and the 14th day of 
January, 2014, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully 
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent, and or did 
attempt to intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent 
a witness, potential witness, and/or person the Defendant believes 
to be a witness, from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in a 
criminal proceeding, to-wit: Ada County case number CR-FE-2013-
0018132, in which the Defendant was charged with the crimes of 
Attempted Strangulation and Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, by asking another person and/or persons to speak with 
[L.M.] and ask her to tell the court that she injured herself, that the 
allegations of attempted strangulation are false, and/or that her 
medications are to blame for what happened, and/or to direct her 
not to appear for court.[2] 
                                            
1 The two cases, Case No. CR-FE-2013-008132 and Case No. CR-FE-2014-
0001189, were consolidated.  (6/20/14 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 13-21.)  Case No. CR-FE-
2014-0001189 is contained in the clerk’s record from pages 241-474. 
2 The district court, based on Sepulveda’s motion, struck the “attempt” language 
from Count I.  (8/8/14 Tr., p. 47, L. 10 – p. 48, L. 13.)  The language “and or did 
attempt to intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent” was struck 
from the Information. (Compare R., p. 278 with 8/11/14 Tr., p. 122, L. 8 – p. 123, 
L. 1.)   
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COUNT II 
 
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or about 
the 30th day of December, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of 
Idaho, attempted to have contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no 
contact order issued in Ada County case number CR-FE-2013-
0018132, where the Defendant was charged with the offense of 
Attempted Strangulation, by calling [L.M.’s] sister and asking her to 
pass certain messages on to [L.M.]. 
 
COUNT III 
 
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or about 
the 2nd day of January, 2014, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, 
attempted to have contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no contact 
order issued in Ada County case number CR-FE-2013-0018132, 
where the Defendant was charged with the offense of Attempted 
Strangulation, by calling a Lisa Cameron and asking her to contact 
L.M. on his behalf. 
 
(R., p. 278.)   
After a trial, the jury found Sepulveda guilty of domestic battery; injury to a 
child; intimidating, impeding, influencing or preventing attendance of a witness; 
and the two counts of attempted violation of a no contact order.  (R., pp. 183-
184, 404-405.) 
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Sepulveda to five 
years with three years fixed.  (R., pp. 456-461.)  The district court retained 
jurisdiction.  (Id.)  Sepulveda filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 236-239, 
463-466.) 
On appeal, Sepulveda raised, for the first time, a claim that felony 
intimidating a witness was a lesser included crime of misdemeanor attempted 
violation of a no contact order and, as a result, his convictions for both crimes 
violated his protections against double jeopardy.  (See Appellant’s Br., pp. 22-
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27.)  Sepulveda did not argue that his convictions ran afoul of the well-
established double jeopardy protections as articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)  (See id.)  
Instead, Sepulveda only claimed that his convictions violated double jeopardy 
because they ran afoul of the “pleading theory.”  (See id.)  The state responded 
by showing that intimidation of a witness is not the means by which Sepulveda 
committed attempted violation of a no contact order, and thus his convictions did 
not violate double jeopardy under the pleading theory.  (See Resp. Br., pp. 29-
37.)   
At oral argument this Court questioned whether the “pleading theory” is 
still valid Idaho law after the repeal of Idaho Code § 18-301.  (See Appellant’s 
Supp. Br., p. 1.)  Sepulveda requested supplemental briefing on the issue and 
this Court granted his motion.  (See June 29, 2016 Order Granting Motion for 
Leave to File Supplemental Briefing.)   
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ISSUE 
 
Sepulveda states the double jeopardy issue on appeal as: 
 
Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right to 
be free from double jeopardy under the Idaho Constitution by entering 
convictions and imposing sentences for each charge in the 2014 case 
when one of those charges was alleged as a means by which each of the 
other two charges was committed. 
 
 
(Supplemental Br., p. 2.) 
 
 For the purposes of the supplemental briefing, the state rephrases the 
double jeopardy issue as: 
 
 Is Sepulveda’s claim that his convictions violate his state constitutional 
right to be free from double jeopardy under the “pleading theory” without merit 
because the “pleading theory” was rooted in statute, not the double jeopardy 
provisions of the Idaho Constitution?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
The “Pleading Theory” Was Based On Statutory Interpretation And Did Not 
Create A Separate Double Jeopardy Right Under The Idaho Constitution 
 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Sepulveda argues his convictions for felony 
intimidation of a witness and two counts of misdemeanor attempted violation of a 
no contact order violate his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy 
under the “pleading theory.”  Sepulveda’s argument fails.   
The United States Supreme Court does not utilize a “pleading theory” to 
evaluate a double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution.  Nor have 
Idaho Courts articulated clear precedent or circumstances unique to the state of 
Idaho that require the Idaho double jeopardy provisions to deviate from those in 
the United States Constitution.  Rather, the “pleading theory” upon which 
Sepulveda relies was based upon the interpretation of Idaho Code §§ 18-301 
and 19-2312.  Because the “pleading theory” does not articulate a separate 
double jeopardy protection under the Idaho Constitution, Sepulveda cannot meet 
his burden of demonstrating fundamental error.  See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010) (defendant alleging error for first time on 
appeal must demonstrate, inter alia, clear violation of unwaived constitutional 
right).   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
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appeal.”  State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).  
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 
P.3d at 979.   
Whether a defendant’s prosecution complies with the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000).  The 
interpretation and application of a statute is also a question of law subject to de 
novo review.  State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. App. 
2011). 
 
C. The Blockburger Test Is The Only Test Applicable To The Double 
Jeopardy Provision Of The United States Constitution 
 
“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions affords a defendant three basic protections.  It protects against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution 
for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for the 
same offense.”  State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370, 256 P.3d 776, 778 (2011) 
(citations omitted).  Whether offenses are the “same” for the purpose of a double 
jeopardy analysis is a question of legislative intent.  Garrett v. United States, 471 
U.S. 773, 778 (1985) (“Where the same conduct violates two statutory 
provisions, the first step in the double jeopardy analysis is to determine whether 
the legislature . . . intended that each violation be a separate offense.”).   
If [the legislature] intended that there be only one offense – that is, 
a defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for 
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a single act, but not under both – there would be no statutory 
authorization for a subsequent prosecution after conviction of one 
of the two provisions, and that would end the double jeopardy 
analysis. 
 
Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778.   
Conversely, if “the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or 
the legislative history” that a defendant can be convicted and punished under 
different statutes for the same conduct, there can be no double jeopardy 
violation.  Id. at 778-779; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) (“With 
respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended.”).  Stated another way, “[t]here is 
nothing in the Constitution which prevents [a legislature] from punishing 
separately each step leading to the consummation of a transaction which it has 
power to prohibit and punishing also the completed transaction.”  Garrett, 471 
U.S. at 779 (quoting Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)).   
In Blockburger, the United States Supreme Court announced a test of 
statutory construction to use in determining legislative intent in evaluating a 
double jeopardy claim.  Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778-779 (“The rule stated in 
Blockburger was applied as a rule of statutory construction to help determine 
legislative intent.”).  The Blockburger test provides:  “where the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to 
be applied to determine whether there have been two offenses or only one for 
double jeopardy purposes is whether each statutory provision requires proof of 
an additional fact which the other does not.”  Corbus, 151 Idaho at 371, 256 P.3d 
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at 779 (citation omitted).  Under the federal constitution, if a statutory analysis 
survives the Blockburger test, there can be no double jeopardy violation.  United 
States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985).    
 
D. The Idaho Supreme Court Has Not Adopted A Double Jeopardy Standard 
In Direct Conflict With The Double Jeopardy Analysis Of The United 
States Supreme Court 
 
Because the Fifth Amendment analysis is controlled by Blockburger, the 
question becomes whether the Idaho constitutional analysis is different.  
Although Idaho courts are not obligated to follow United States Supreme Court 
precedent in interpreting our state constitution, see State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 
981, 987, 842 P.2d 660, 666 (1992), in those cases where the Idaho Supreme 
Court has determined the Idaho Constitution provides greater protections than 
the United States Constitution, the Court articulates the reasons why.  See State 
v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 88-89, 90 P.3d 306, 313-314 (2004) (discussing cases 
and noting that, in those cases, the Court “provided greater protection to Idaho 
citizens based on the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-
standing jurisprudence”); cf. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 406-407, 825 
P.2d 501, 503-504 (1992) (declining to consider claim that Idaho Constitution 
affords greater protection absent supporting argument).  The Idaho Supreme 
Court “recently reiterated that in order for the Idaho Constitution’s interpretation 
to deviate from the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, there must be clear 
precedent to that effect or circumstances unique to the state of Idaho or its 
Constitution that would compel such a result.”  State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 
892, 354 P.3d 446, 454 (2015).   
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Nothing in the line of cases that apply the “pleading theory” has ever 
articulated clear precedent or unique circumstances that compel a deviation from 
the well-established double jeopardy protections contained in the United States 
Constitution.  Sepulveda even appears to partially concede this point.  (See 
Appellant’s Supp. Br., p. 12 (“Thus, even though Reichenberg and Berglund 
found no justification for additional double jeopardy protections in those specific 
cases, that does not mean Idaho’s double jeopardy provision will not provide 
additional protections in all circumstances.”).)   
In Corbus, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed a series of Idaho 
Supreme Court cases and concluded “the Court has not been entirely consistent 
in its application of either the Blockburger test or the pleading theory in double 
jeopardy cases.”  Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374, 256 P.3d at 782.  The so-called 
“pleading theory” of double jeopardy essentially converts a test of statutory 
construction under Blockburger into one of prosecutorial intent.  Such a 
departure is unwarranted, particularly given that the Court has never expressly 
articulated any reason to deviate from the analytical framework used in 
Blockburger, and the reason for the departure appears to be based on a statute 
that does not relate to the protections guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.     
Reference to a “pleading theory” of double jeopardy appears to have its 
genesis in State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980).  At issue in 
Thompson was “whether the charge of assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser 
included offense in a charge of attempted robbery, as alleged herein, such as to 
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preclude conviction under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of 
the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution.”  Id. at 433, 614 P.2d 
at 973.  With respect to the Fifth Amendment, the Court, quoting Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161 (1977), stated:  “It has long been understood that separate 
statutory crimes need not be identical either in constituent elements or in actual 
proof in order to be the same within the meaning of the constitutional 
prohibition.”  Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433, 614 P.2d at 973.  The Court then 
noted that “[m]any jurisdictions have expanded the definition of lesser included 
offenses beyond the statutory theory and utilize what is called the ‘indictment’ or 
‘pleading’ theory,” and stated, “Idaho has adopted this pleading approach both 
by statute and by case law.”  Id. at 433-434, 614 P.2d at 973-974 (citing 
I.C. § 19-2312 and cases).    
To the extent the Court in Thompson used Brown v. Ohio, as a platform 
for applying a test more lenient than Blockburger, it must be noted that the 
United States Supreme Court, in fact, applied the Blockburger statutory analysis 
in Brown in concluding that joyriding was a “lesser included offense” of auto theft 
because it was “clearly not the case that each statute requires proof of a fact 
which the other does not.”  432 U.S. at 167 (citation and quotations omitted).  
The Court, consistent with Blockburger, also acknowledged the result would 
have been different had the state legislature “provided that joyriding is a separate 
offense for each day in which a motor vehicle is operated without the owner’s 
consent.”  Id. at 169 n.8.  Thus, Brown does not support a broader pleading 
theory analysis under the Fifth Amendment.   
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Sepulveda argues that Thompson created the pleading theory as a test 
for assessing whether a double jeopardy violation occurred under the Idaho 
Constitution.  (See Appellant’s Supp. Br., pp. 5-7.)  Sepulveda bases his 
argument on the structure of Thompson opinion.  (See Appellant’s Supp. Br., 
p. 6.)  However, the actual analysis in Thompson, combined with the case law on 
which the Thompson holding was based, reveals that Sepulveda’s argument is 
misplaced.   
The Court in Thompson did not articulate any particular reason why the 
state constitutional protection against double jeopardy in Idaho would be greater 
than that found under the federal constitution.  Rather, the Court in Thompson 
simply noted that Idaho “has adopted [a] pleading approach both by statute and 
by case law.”  101 Idaho at 433-434, 614 P.2d at 973-974.  The statute to which 
the Court referred is I.C. § 19-2312, which reads:  “The jury may find the 
defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included 
in that with which he is charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit the 
offense.”  This statute does not support a “pleading theory” of double jeopardy.   
The “case law” referenced by the Court in Thompson consists of three 
cases that interpreted Idaho statutes regarding statutory double jeopardy and 
lesser included offenses.  See id. (citing State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352 
P.2d 972 (1960); State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 383 P.2d 602 (1963); State v. 
Blacksten, 86 Idaho 401, 387 P.2d 467 (1963)).  All three of the cases relied 
upon by Thompson either interpret Idaho Code § 18-301 or § 19-2312 and none 
create a separate constitutional test.  Anderson holds:    
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We therefore hold, in our desire to clear the confusion which has 
arisen in the premises, that pursuant to I.C. § 19–2312, any 
offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that 
charged in the indictment or information, is an included offense; 
that, therefore, it is proper for an accused to request, and for the 
trial court to give, an instruction permitting a conviction of such an 
included offense, if there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction of the included offense. 
 
Anderson, 82 Idaho at 303, 352 P.2d at 978.   
Hall explained that Idaho Code § 18-301 provides broader protections 
than constitutional double jeopardy: 
Our statutory provision against double jeopardy is as follows: 
 
‘An act or omission which is made punishable in different 
ways by different provisions of this code may be punished 
under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be 
punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction 
and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the 
same act or omission under any other.’ I.C. § 18-301. 
 
We have said that this statute enlarges the scope of the 
constitutional provision against double jeopardy in that it prohibits 
double punishment ‘for the same act or omission’ and is not limited 
to the ‘same offense.’ State v. Randolph, 61 Idaho 456, 102 P.2d 
913. 
 
Giving the statute its broadest possible application, it is not a bar to 
the present prosecution for robbery because both the robbery and 
the murder did not arise out of the same ‘act or omission.’ 
 
Hall, 86 Idaho at 74-75, 383 P.2d at 609-610 (overruled by Sivak v. State, 112 
Idaho 197, 206-208, 731 P.2d 192, 211-213 (1986)).   
Finally, Blacksten examined lesser included offenses in the context of 
Idaho statutes:  
In this case the information charged an aggravated battery and 
further alleged that it ‘was committed by said defendant, as 
aforesaid, with a premeditated design and by means calculated 
and likely to inflict great bodily injury.’ Thus, the information was 
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sufficient to charge an aggravated assault as well as aggravated 
battery. The assault having been alleged as the manner and 
means of the commission of the aggravated battery, it was an 
included offense and the information, therefore, was not 
duplicitous. I.C. §§ 19-2312, 19-1413 (repealed 1963 S.L., c. 159), 
19-1703; State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352 P.2d 972; State v. 
Wall, 73 Idaho 142, 248 P.2d 222; State v. Petty, 73 Idaho 136, 
248 P.2d 218. 
 
Blacksten, 86 Idaho at 411, 387 P.2d at 472 (footnote omitted).  Thompson, and 
the three primary cases upon which Thompson relied, articulated interpretations 
of Idaho statutes, not the creation of new double jeopardy rights.   
The only explicit reference in Thompson to the Court’s departure from 
Blockburger is found in a footnote where the Court states:  “Blockburger sets 
forth the minimum standards required so that the fifth amendment prohibition 
against double jeopardy is not violated.  The[] cases [relied upon by the state] do 
not stand for the proposition that only the Blockburger test is relevant in Idaho.”  
Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 n.5, 614 P.2d at 975 n.5.  While the Court in 
Thompson clearly did not think Blockburger was the only “relevant” test in Idaho, 
the articulated basis for the Court’s departure from Blockburger was statutory as 
reflected in its reliance on I.C. § 19-2312.3  
Sepulveda argues that the “pleading theory” became a constitutional test 
because some version of Idaho Code § 19-2312 existed at the time of the 
drafting of the Idaho Constitution.  (See Appellant’s Supp. Br., pp. 8-10.)  Even if 
                                            
3 I.C. § 19-2312 provides that a defendant may be convicted of any offense 
“which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment, 
or of an attempt to commit the offense.”  This statute relates to due process 
(when a defendant may be convicted of an included offense at trial), not double 
jeopardy.  Moreover, nothing in this statute is inconsistent with the Blockburger 
test. 
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Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution is interpreted in light of the common law 
and statutes then existing at the time of its drafting, see e.g., Green, 158 Idaho 
at 889, 354 P.3d at 541, the “pleading theory” is not contained within that statute.  
The “pleading theory” was articulated by the Thompson Court – many decades 
after the Idaho Constitution was drafted.   
Further, interpreting I.C. § 19-2312 as imposing a “pleading theory” 
analysis upon a double jeopardy claim not only interferes with the enforcement 
of separate crimes as they have been defined by the legislature, it is inconsistent 
with express legislative acts regarding double jeopardy.  In addition to relying on 
I.C. § 19-2312, the Court in Thompson also cited I.C. §18-301, which provided: 
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by 
different provisions of this code may be punished under either of 
such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than 
one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars  
prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.   
 
 Reliance on I.C. § 18-301 for a broader interpretation of double jeopardy 
in Thompson was understandable because when that statute was in effect it had 
“been held to provide a greater scope of protection than the constraints of double 
jeopardy found in the Idaho and United States Constitutions.”  State v. Seamons, 
126 Idaho 809, 811, 892 P.2d 484, 486 (1995).  The legislature, however, 
repealed I.C. § 18-301 in 1995, suggesting it did not intend to afford greater 
protections than the state or federal constitutions.  As such, any continued 
reliance on I.C. § 18-301 as a source of greater state constitutional protection is 
no longer valid.       
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The Idaho Appellate Court published opinions, post-1995 repeal of Idaho 
Code § 18-301, that cite to the “pleading theory” do not provide a constitutional 
basis for the “pleading theory.”  These cases simply cite to a line of cases that 
originated in statutory interpretation.  See State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524, 
944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997) (utilizing the pleading theory within the context of 
I.C. § 19-2312 to determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense); 
State v. Rosencrantz, 130 Idaho 666, 668, 946 P.2d 628, 630 (1997) (citing to 
Curtis to hold that defendant did not meet the first prong of the pleading theory); 
State v. Payne, 134 Idaho 423, 424, 3 P.3d 1251, 1252 (2000) (citing to Curtis to 
hold that offense was not lesser included); State v. Matalamaki, 139 Idaho 341, 
343, 79 P.3d 162, 164 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that, based on I.C. § 19-2312 
and Curtis, a particular offense may be a lesser included offense under the 
“pleading theory” or “statutory theory”); State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, 653, 84 
P.3d 586, 589 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Curtis for the proposition that a crime can 
be a lesser included offense under either the “pleading theory” or the “statutory 
theory”); State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 123, 127, 138 P.3d 323, 327 (Ct. App. 
2005), aff’d, 143 Idaho 108, 138 P.3d 308 (2006) (holding that under Curtis and 
I.C. § 19-2312 a crime can be  lesser included offense under either the “pleading 
theory” or the “statutory theory”); State v. Cochran, 149 Idaho 688, 691, 239 P.3d 
793, 796 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Rae and I.C. § 19-2312 for the proposition that 
the “pleading theory” is one of two theories to determine whether a crime is a 
lesser included offense); Corbus, 151 Idaho at 375, 256 P.3d at 783 (“It is not 
clear from existing precedent whether the Blockburger test, the pleading theory 
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used in Thompson, or the pleading theory used in Stewart, Pizzuto, and Sivak 
should properly be applied in this case.”); State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529, 
261 P.3d 519, 523 (2011) (citing Curtis for proposition that the “pleading theory” 
can be used to determine a lesser included offense); State v. McKinney, 153 
Idaho 837, 841, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013) (citing Thompson for proposition 
that Idaho has adopted the “pleading theory” to determine if a crime is a lesser 
included offense); State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8, 304 P.3d 276, 283 (2013) (citing 
Flegel); State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3, 330 P.3d 400, 404 n.3 (Ct. App. 
2014), review denied Aug. 15, 2014 (citing Thompson for the proposition that the 
Idaho Constitution utilizes a “pleading theory” to determine if an offense is a 
lesser included offense)4; State v. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 648, 339 
P.3d 372, 373 (2014) (citing Curtis, Flegel, Thompson, and Sivak for the 
“pleading theory”); State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621, 624 (2016) 
(citing Sanchez-Castro for the “pleading theory”); State v. Weatherly, 160 Idaho 
302, __, __ P.3d __ (Ct. App. 2016) (citing McKinney and Thompson for the 
“pleading theory”).   
Holding that the Idaho Constitution’s double jeopardy protection is entirely 
different from the United States Constitution, and based on a completely 
different rationale, is unwarranted where there has been no clear statement by 
the Idaho Supreme Court that the Idaho Constitution requires otherwise and no 
Idaho statute can compel a constitutional separate “pleading theory” analysis.  
                                            
4 This statement in Moad by the Idaho Court of Appeals that Thompson stands 
for the proposition that the “pleading theory” is based on the Idaho Constitution is 
not supported by the holding in Thompson. (See supra).   
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The state, therefore, submits that the sole test for determining whether two 
separate offenses may be pursued in a single prosecution is the test articulated 
in Blockburger.     
The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause allows conviction and 
punishment for multiple offenses arising from single acts if the legislature so 
intended.  A “pleading theory” of double jeopardy is inconsistent with the federal 
test to the extent it relies solely on the pleadings of the prosecutor without regard 
to legislative intent.  It is difficult to conceive how a defendant’s constitutional 
rights are based solely on how a prosecutor chooses to draft a complaint.   
Because the “pleading theory” does not articulate a separate double 
jeopardy protection under the Idaho Constitution, Sepulveda has failed to show 
his constitutional protections against double jeopardy were violated when the 
district court entered convictions for felony intimidation of a witness and 
misdemeanor attempted violation of a no contact order.5  Having failed to make 
that showing, Sepulveda has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating 
fundamental error.  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
                                            
5 Even if the “pleading theory” is applied, Sepulveda failed to show that felony 
intimidation of a witness is a lesser included offense of misdemeanor attempted 
violation of a no contact order.  (See Resp. Br., pp. 28-34.)   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.   
DATED this 13th day of July, 2016. 
 
       
 __/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___ 
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 Deputy Attorney General 
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